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1. THERAPEUTIC PRIVILEGE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Decisions dealing with the therapeutic privilege defence are notably absent in 
South African law. There are, however, a few obiter dicta, which may be seen 
as "starting points for the defence". 1 Thus Watermeyer J remarked in SA 
Medical and Dental Council v McLoughlin: 2 "It may sometimes even be advisable 
for a medical man to keep secret from his patient the form of treatment which he 
is giving him, and for a medical men to disclose to anyone, other than the 
patient, the form of treatment which he is carrying out, may amount to a breach 
of confidence between doctor and patient." This statement is in no way 
conclusive, however. It alludes to the issue of confidentiality in the context of 
the doctor-patient relationship and hardly even contains the rudiments of the 
therapeutic privilege defence. Somewhat more to the point is what Watermeyer 
J had to say in Richter v Another and Estate Hammann3 when referring to the 
problems surrounding the so-called therapeutic privilege of the medical 
profession. He described the doctor's dilemma in a way that clearly 
contributed to the wider debate concerning the existence and the desirability or 
otherwise of this defence when he explained : "If he fails to disclose the risks he 
may render himself liable to an action for assault, whereas if he discloses them 
he might well frighten the patient into not having the operation when the doctor 
knows full well that it would be in the patient's interests to have it." Ackermann 
J, in the most detailed judgement4 on informed consent delivered to date by a 
South African court, expressly acknowledged the existence of the therapeutic 
privilege defence in South African law, but left open the question what "the ambit 
of the so-called 'privilege' may today still be". Whilst not rejecting the defence 
out of hand, Ackermann J appears to hold the view that it does not accord fully 
2 
3 
4 
Van Oosten "The so-called 'Therapeutic Privilege' or "Contra-Indication" 1991 Med Law 
33. 
1948 (2) SA 355 (A) at 336. 
1976 (3) SA 226 (C) at 232. 
Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) at 426. 
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with the present-day developments of our law which clearly promote patient 
autonomy and self-determination. 5 It was not necessary for the Castell court to 
spell out the ambit and parameters of the privilege and, accordingly, uncertainty 
prevails concerning its precise nature and role in what may be generally be 
described as non-disclosure actions. 6 
South African legal opinion, scant as it may be, appears to be unanimous in its 
acceptance in principle of the notion.that in exceptional circumstances the duty 
to disclose may be suspended. 7 This is an exception to the general rule that 
ordinarily "a patient in a non-emergency case must be informed of the nature of 
the treatment and the substantial risks it holds for him"8 or her. Such a 
withholding of information must be in the best interest of the patient himself, but 
may also be justified where full disclosure may create a substantial danger to a 
third party. 9 This common-sense view is widely supported in medico-legal 
literature and may predictably be upheld in suitable cases brought before South 
African Courts. 10 But then therapeutic privilege has received virtually no 
attention in the judgements of our courts so far, except for the few dicta 
mentioned above. As was observed above, the Caste/f' 1 court did not find it 
necessary to pursue this issue further, because the therapeutic privilege was not 
invoked in that case to justify non-disclosure. Ackermann J acknowledged, 
however, that this issue forms "part of the wider debate concerning consent to 
medical treatment and whether emphasis should be placed on the autonomy 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
See Dreyer "Redelike Dokter versus Redelike Patient" 1995 THRHR 538. 
See Van den Heever "The Patient's Right to Know : Informed Consent in South African 
Medical Law" 1995 De Rebus 56. 
See Van Oosten op cit - note 1 at 33 and Van Oosten Consent 60. 
Strauss Doctor 10. 
Giesen MML 382. 
See Strauss Doctor 1 O and Strauss Legal Handbook yth ed (1992) 13. 
Castell supra at 418. 
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and right of self-determination of the patient in the light of all the facts or on the 
right of the medical profession to determine the meaning of reasonable 
disclosure". 12 
In order to explore the parameters of the medical therapeutic privilege this wider 
debate must be entered. This paper therefore critically examines the nature and 
scope of the therapeutic privilege defence in non-disclosure cases in the context 
of the doctor's undisputed general. legal-ethical duty to procure a properly 
informed consent from his patient and his equally undisputed medico-ethical 
duty to heal, which sometimes are in conflict. 13 That conflict constitutes the 
doctor's dilemma referred to in the Richter14 case. The judicial formulations of 
the so-called therapeutic privilege defence are attempts to resolve this conflict 
equitably. How successful such attempts can be is a moot point and open to 
discussion as the legal literature on this point indicates. The judicial formulations 
of the privilege raise a number of questions. 
To answer these questions I initially examine the different aspects of informed 
consent, focussing on the legal, ethical and clinical dimensions thereof. Then 
I explore the leading judicial formulations of the therapeutic privilege concept. 
Thirdly, I evaluate the ongoing debate concerning the parameters of the 
privilege in the light of the foregoing analysis. 
2. THERAPEUTIC PRIVILEGE IN PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 Introduction 
The doctrine of informed consent came from America, but different jurisdictions 
12 Ibid. 
13 See Van Oosten 1991 Med Law 31. 
14 Supra at 232. 
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interpret it differently. Whereas the term informed consent has been rejected as 
inapplicable in Australia and England, 15 the Caste//16 court expressly accepted 
it as meaningful. It is used to uphold "the ethical principle of self-determination 
which underlies the legal principle of informed consent to medical treatment". 17 
In other words, the legal requirement for consent expresses respect for the 
patient's autonomy. As a general rule patients cannot be required to accept 
treatment they do not want, no matter what the consequences are if they refuse 
to undergo it. It is this proposition that is recognised "as both an ethical 
principle and a legal rule"; 18 its foundational principle is respect for the patient's 
autonomy or the patient's right to self-determination. This principle lies at the 
heart of the physician-patient relationship. Informed consent, ultimately, is a 
moral principle as applied to questions of medical ethics. 19 Its correlative is 
proxy consent which is invoked when dealing with a patient who is incompetent 
to give informed consent for one reason or another, as informed consent 
presupposes competence or "the capacity to make an autonomous decision 
using a well-informed conscience".20 
The language of self-determination also prevails in the report of the American 
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical Research: 1980 - 1983 (USA). 21 The Commission indicated that 
"the sole or primary value underlying its first-party consent provisions is respect 
for autonomy", describing the principle of self-determination as the cornerstone 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Earle, "Informed Consent : Is there Room for the Reasonable Patient in South African 
Law?" 1995 SALJ 629. 
Supra at 426. 
Earle op cit - note 15 at 629. 
Jones Medical Negligence (1991) 200. 
See Guevin "The Principles of Informed (Proxy) Consent and Totality in the Reputable 
Practice of Medicine" 1996 American Journal of Jurisprudence 189. 
Ibid 199. 
See Faden & Beauchamp A History and Theory of Informed Consent (1986) 98. 
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of its point of view. 22 It argued that the requirements of informed consent are 
"essentially moral and policy-oriented, rather than legal"23 in spite of the fact that 
it primarily emerged from a history in law. 
The Resource Document on the Pri nci pies of Informed Consent pub I ished by the 
American Psychiatric Association (APA)24 accordingly decreed : "Informed 
consent has legal, ethical, and clinical dimensions." It elaborated on this 
distinction as follows: "a) From a legal perspective, it requires physicians to 
disclose certain classes of information to patients, and to obtain their consent 
before initiating medical treatment. b) In its ethical dimension informed consent 
encourages respect for individual autonomy in medical decision making. c) As 
a clinical process, informed consent offers a mechanism for collaboration 
between physicians and patients in identifying clinical problems and selecting 
appropriate treatment." The APA Document also pointed out that whereas legal 
requirements define the minimum criteria for an adequate informed consent 
process, their implementation and augmentation will be a reflection of an 
appropriate concern with ethical and clinical considerations. Law, ethics and 
bioethics are different yet related concepts that interact with each other in 
various ways. Whereas laws are mandatory rules, ethics is a set of moral 
standards while bioethics refers to moral issues and problems surrounding 
medical treatment and research. These standards can be personal, 
organisational, institutional or worldwide, but non-adherence to them does not 
incur the risk of civil or criminal liability, rather moral reproach and disapproval. 
There are no legal sanctions attached to behaviour that is considered morally 
wrong, of course.25 Moral standards are not legally binding rules. They set forth 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Ibid 99 et seq. 
Ibid 99. 
State Newsletter July/August 1996 (Internet). 
See Lewis & Tamparo Medical Law, Ethics and Bioethics in the Medical Office 3rd ed 
(1993) 9. 
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universal goals instead which may evolve into foundational principles of legal 
rules, however. A direct conflict sometimes arises between the doctor's medico-
ethical duty to heal and his or her legal-ethical duty to inform the patient in 
question adequately. 26 Such a conflict situation calls for a mechanism for 
conflict resolution. The so-called therapeutic privilege as an exception to the 
informed-consent requisite purports to be exactly that. 
The nature and role of the therapeutic privile9e remain matters of uncertainty, 
however, and present controversial issues relating to the informed-consent 
requisite. This controversy is aggravated by the fact that the creation of such 
an exception to the general rule definitely infringes upon the fundamental 
principle of patient autonomy: "The wider the scope of the therapeutic-necessity 
or contra-indication defence is defined, the narrower the scope of the informed-
consent requisite becomes, and vice versa."27 This has all the ingredients of a 
vicious circle, it seems, and certainly calls for a closer look at the parameters of 
medical therapeutic privilege in the wider context of informed consent as a 
complex legal, ethical and clinical process. 
2.2 Legal Aspects of Informed Consent and Therapeutic Privilege 
The medico-legal topic of informed consent is part of the wider issue of truth-
telling in medicine which in turn is not primarily a legal matter, but concerns 
professional ethics. There is, however, "a definite legal dimension to the subject 
of truth-telling in medicine", 28 as the emergence of the defence of therapeutic 
privilege in American law has clearly demonstrated. 
The presumption of self-determination as the foundational principle of the 
26 See Van Oosten 1991 Med Law31. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Strauss Doctor 15. 
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doctrine of informed consent is the common-law analogue of the constitutional 
right to privacy, of course. Any attempt to curtail this basic human right by 
asserting a societal health interest or a duty to heal puts a heavy burden upon 
its proponents (the health-care providers) as they will have to show why this 
interest should prevail in a particular case.29 The basis for the following 
discussion is, however, not an analysis based on a constitutional right of 
privacy, but rather of what might be termed a common-law analysis of the right 
of the individual to make medical decisions. 
Informed consent becomes only operative once subjects have full and free 
access to all the necessary information that enables them to make appropriate 
health care decisions. For this reason their doctor must tell them the truth about 
their diagnosis and prognosis, of course. However, "the patient's right to be told 
the truth"30 may be subject to the physician's therapeutic privilege in exceptional 
cases. This is a reference to "the legal doctrine" in terms of which doctors may 
be justified in withholding information from patients for two reasons, namely (1) 
"if they reasonably believe this information would not be in the patient's best 
interests" or (2) that it "would interfere with treatment and care".31 
The debate on compulsory blood tests is reminiscent of controversy surrounding 
this doctrine. It "amounts to a showdown between the idea that the truth should 
be discovered whenever possible and the idea that personal privacy should be 
respected", as the court in C v Minister of Correctional Services32 put it crisply, 
adding that the "resolution of that debate would depend largely upon the store 
the Court sets by each idea, on its own sense of priority in that regard", as both 
29 
30 
31 
32 
See Meisel "The 'Exceptions' to the Informed Consent Doctrine : Striking a Balance 
between Competing Values in Medical Decision-Making" 1979 Wis L Rev431 n 70. 
Williams "Ethics in Cross-Cultural Health" in Masi et al (eds) Health and Culture : 
Exploring the Relationships (1993) 263. 
Ibid. 
1996 (4) SA 292 (TPD) at 300. 
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ideas are important, but neither sacrosanct. In other words, judicial policy is the 
decisive factor in this matter. 
In the context of HIV and informed consent the argument for medical discretion 
appears to discard the idea of respect for personal privacy completely when it 
is stated as follows: "The matter of undefinable 'informed consent' for blood 
testing for HIV infection, as anticipated, has become ludicrous ..... Unless 
doctors, as has always been customary, are free to investigate as they see fit, 
the epidemic will never be quantified and controlled."33 The veiled reference to 
traditional medical paternalism cannot go unnoticed in this context. The 
advocated infringement of the individual's right to make medical decisions based 
on informed consent indicates that the patient's right to know is seen as 
contingent upon some sort of therapeutic privilege of physician's to withhold 
information where non-disclosure would appear to be in the societal interest of 
controlling an epidemic that threatens the very fabric of society. 
This view is in stark contrast with informed consent as a social policy which does 
not accept the paternalistic presumption that the patient's right of self-decision 
should be suspended where this, in the physician's subjective opinion, might be 
in the patient's, as well as in society's best interests.34 
As the doctrine of informed consent tends to the expansion of liability of the 
medical profession, significant inroads into the doctrine can only occur in a 
climate of judicial policy (if any such policy can be identified) discouraging such 
expansion. In South Africa the present judicial climate seems to be strongly in 
favour of the patient's right of self-determination and a policy of informed 
consent, with such a right as its basic premise. In view of this fact, the 
33 
34 
Fennel "HIV and Informed Consent" (letter) 1996 AIDS Scan 14. 
See also the American Psychiatric Association's "Resource Document on Principles of 
Informed Consent" 1996 State Newsletters which states: "Many states allow psychiatric 
treatment to occur without patients' informed consent when countervailing policy 
objectives can thereby be achieved." 
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advocated policy change concerning compulsory testing for HIV antibodies is 
unlikely to occur for the time being, whatever its merits might be from a medical 
point of view. 
The physician's degree of disclosure is affected by a multitude of variables, 
which allow for exceptions to the general rule of disclosure. Thus, in South 
African law, emergency, unconscious condition (the doctrine of negotiorum 
gestio), waiver and therapeutic pr~vilege are recognised exceptions to the 
general disclosure rule. 35 Where the therapeutic privilege is invoked 
beneficence-based considerations of the welfare of patients are allowed to 
override the patient's right to authorise or refuse medical care or, at least, to 
compete with it successfully in exceptional circumstances. But respect for 
autonomy has thereby not been abandoned in law as the justificatory basis of 
the patient's right of self-determination. It is merely circumscribed in view of the 
doctor's dilemma referred to above. The dilemma facing the doctor is said to 
have led to the limited acceptance of the so-called therapeutic privilege in law. 
The underlying principle, the right of the patient to decide what, if anything, 
should be done with or to his body is not subverted thereby. Informed consent 
and its flip side, informed refusal, as a process of two-way communication 
between client and health-care provider, and "a process of disclosure, 
information sharing and deliberation"36 is not abandoned; it is just modified in 
view of the doctor's dilemma which the law recognises as a real one, calling for 
a pragmatic, undogmatic or realistic approach to legal issues affecting the 
professional liability of doctors. 
35 
36 
See Claassen & Verschoor Medical Negligence in South Africa (1992) 69 et seq. The 
APA Resource Document 1996 op cit - note 24 - provides the following categories of 
exceptions to the disclosure requirements: emergency, waiver, therapeutic privilege, 
incompetence and involuntary treatment. 
The American Society for Gastrointestinal Endoscopy (ASGE) Risk Management: An 
Information Resource Manual (Internet). This "process" is one of "complete and candid 
communication", according to Katz "The Doctor's Dilemma : Duty and Risk in the 
Treatment of Jehovah's Witnesses" 1996 SALJ 484. 
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"The concept of informed consent is based on the ethical concept of self-
determination or autonomy", as the Information Resource Manual prepared by 
the American Society for Gastrointestinal Endoscopy (ASGE) puts it, therefore 
doctors will always "have not only an ethical and moral duty to obtain informed 
consent prior to procedure, but a legal one as well."37 The ASGE Manual also 
remarks candidly that the "process of informed consent is an excellent risk 
management technique", with two major advantages for the doctor attached to 
it: (1) It offers an excellent opportunity to communicate with the patient. "Trust 
and mutual respect develop. Remember, ifthe patient likes you, he is less likely 
to sue you. (2) During the disclosure process of informed consent, you 
effectively shift the risk and burden of potential complications to the patient-
consumer. Once the patient bears the risks, you indemnify yourself against 
liability arising from realized complications." Within the framework of the 
process of informed consent the doctor's therapeutic privilege is an additional 
defence available to the doctor which, if invoked, must be proved. That is its 
"true analysis" according to Lord Scarman in Sidaway v Beth/em Royal Hospital 
Governors. 38 He attributes the introduction of this defence into the law of 
informed consent to the existence of the prudent patient test, the prudent patient 
being a norm, not a real person. He argues: "Hence there is a need that the 
doctor should have the opportunity of proving that he reasonably believed that 
disclosure of the risk would be damaging to his patient or contrary to his best 
interest. This is what the Americans call the doctor's 'therapeutic privilege"'.39 
The American Psychiatric Association in its 1996 Resource Document on 
Principles of Informed Consent lists five categories of exceptions to disclosure 
requirements, therapeutic privilege being one of them. The Document states : 
"Some jurisdictions permit information to be withheld when disclosure per se 
would be likely to cause harm to patients (e.g., when a patient with an unstable 
37 Op cit - note 36. 
38 [1985] 1 All ER 635 (HL} at 654. 
39 Ibid. 
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cardiac arrhythmia would have his or her situation exacerbated by the anxiety 
attendant on full disclosure of the risks of treatment). The harm cannot result 
from patients' decisions not to receive the proposed treatment. This exception 
must be construed narrowly lest it undermine the general principle of informed 
consent."40 
As an analysis of the law of fifty American states has shown, the notion of a 
therapeutic privilege is equally common in jurisdictions with professional (doctor-
determined) standards of disclosure as in those which adhere to an objective 
patient-based test, except that in the latter jurisdictions the notions about the 
therapeutic privilege of medical professionals are stricter and less generous 
than in the former. 41 This is not surprising, since "the wider the parameters of 
informed consent are defined, the narrower becomes the scope of the 
privilege"42 and vice versa. 
The recognition of a defence of this nature in South Africa recently has attracted 
critical comment on the grounds that it makes "serious inroads upon the patient's 
fundamental rights relating to autonomy and self-determination",43 since its 
invocation sanctions a professional discretion to withhold information. But then 
"the doctor's legal duty of disclosure to the patient is a relative one only"44 after 
all. In determining the scope of the doctor's duty to disclose two values must be 
taken into consideration, "namely the duty of the doctor to act in what he 
conceives to be in the best interests of the patient and the right of the patient to 
control his own life and to have the information necessary to do so", as King CJ 
40 Op cit. - note 24. 
41 See Giesen MML 377. 
42 Van den Heever op cit - note 6 at 434. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Strauss Doctor 15. 
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observed in the Australian case F v R45 which observation was quoted with 
approval by Ackermann J in Castell v Greef 46 
As a unified doctrine, which comprises the requirements of disclosure and 
consent and the legally recognised exceptions, the doctrine of informed consent 
is able to accommodate both values, balancing them depending upon the facts 
and circumstances of the particular case. 47 Consequently, no "firm and inflexible 
balance is to be found in the law of informed consent"48 as it stands in North 
America as well as in South Africa today. In other words : "The doctrine 
subordinates the societal concern with health to individualism, but not in any 
fixed proportion."49 The legal and ethical consensus on the right of individuals 
that has developed over the past twenty years is therefore in no way 
endangered by the recognition of the therapeutic-privilege defence. It is rather 
enhanced thereby . 
2.3 Ethical Aspects of Informed Consent and Therapeutic Privilege 
The last two decades of the 20th century have witnessed an increased interest 
in the ethical dimensions of health care which is thought to be part of "an 
explosion of interest in the ethical dimensions of various aspects of society" in 
general typical of "the ethics era" within this century. 50 The American Medical 
Association's official policy on informed consent, published in 1981, in particular, 
closely copying the language of Canterbury v Spence, 51 the landmark American 
45 (1983) SASR 189 at 191. 
46 Supra - note 4 at 423. 
47 See Meisel op cit- note 29 at 434. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. See also Williams op cit - note 30 at 261. 
50 Williams op c;t - note 30 at 255. 
51 464 F 2d 772 (DC App 1972). 
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decision of 1971, is "a testament to the impact of the law of informed consent on 
medical ethics". 52 
Ethics in this context means "the study of morality, of the good and the bad, the 
right and the wrong in human decision making and behaviour"53 in the wider 
sense. Bioethics on the other hand refers to "the moral issues and problems 
that have arisen as a result of modern medicine and research"54 and the rapid 
diffusion of modern medical technolBgv in particular. The ethical problems that 
arise when this technology is used provide the substance of bioethical reflection 
and action. 
Medical ethics is a subdivision of this field of study and practice. Most of the 
work done in this area has up to now reflected a monocultural perspective on 
both health care and ethics, with the competent, rational individual adult as the 
norm for ethical decision-making.55 Each individual's decision to make use of 
medical advances rationally was therefore seen as "the biggest medical ethical 
choice of all".56 However, in recent years there has been a growing recognition 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
Faden & Beauchamp op cit - note 21 at 98. 
William op cit - note 30 at 256. 
Lewis & Tamparo op cit - note 25 at 8. The formulation of the Nuremberg Code in the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial of Nazi doctors which began on December 9, 1946 was ''the 
beginning of the modern effort to ensure conduct in research" according to Moreno 
"Reassessing the Influence of the Nuremberg Code on American Medical Ethics" 1997 
Journal of Contemporary Health, Law and Policy 347. As the Holocaust and Hiroshima 
mark the beginning of the postmodern world this effort should more appropriately be 
characterised as "postmodern", however. "The 'double discourse' of the postmodern 
world is both illustrated and illuminated in our post-World War II discourse on human 
experimentation; a discourse that simultaneously condemns the Nazi experiments as 
barbaric, while demanding access to contemporary experiments as a human right", 
. according to Annas "Questing for Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal and Self-Deception in Post-
modern Medical Research" 1996 Journal of Contemporary Heaffh Law and Policy 299. 
See Williams op cit - note 30 at 260. The United States judges who formulated the 
Nuremberg Code adhered to a natural law theory. It was derived from universal moral, 
ethical and legal concepts and intended for universal application. See Annas op cit -
note 54 301. 
Chuang & Man "Medical Ethics- Informed Consent- Ethical Considerations" 1983 Med 
Law25. 
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that the dominant North American approach to bioethics with its emphasis on the 
autonomous individual in medical decision-making is in fact "a minority position 
within the global community"57 and must be treated as such, when considering 
the twin issues of disclosure standards and non-disclosure privileges. 
Informed consent and telling the truth to terminally ill patients are two of the 
major recurrent ethical issues in contemporary health care. The concept of 
communicative action highlights two aspects of the process of informed consent: 
"the teleological one of implementing an action plan and the communicative one 
of arriving at a shared interpretation of the situation, or more generally, of 
reaching consensus."58 The procedure of discursive decision-making aims at 
reaching agreement as a mechanism for coordinating actions: "The kind of 
agreement that is the goal of efforts to reach understanding depends on 
rationally motivated approval of the substance of an utterance",59 however. 
It cannot be brought about by manipulating one's partner in interaction, as far 
as discourse ethics is concerned. Thus, for instance, the assumption that the 
deception involved in administering placebos (the use of pharmacologically 
inactive substances) is justified in the interests of the patient's well-being, could 
be challenged from a discourse ethical point of view, since the use of placebos 
involves misrepresentation either as to the patient's condition or the nature of 
the cure. 60 
It is a basic moral principle of our society that one should tell the truth. This 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Williams op cit- note 30 at 261. 
Habermas Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990) 134 et seq. 
Ibid 134. Or as the Nuremberg Code formulates : "The voluntary consent of the human 
subject is absolutely essential. This means that the person involved .... should have 
sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved 
as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision", as the 
Nuremberg Code puts it according to Annas op cit - note 54 303 n 13. 
See Giesen MML 383. 
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principle is subject to exceptions, however, since there are circumstances in 
which withholding the truth or even telling a lie is justified by our moral intuitions. 
These are intuitions "that instruct us on how best to behave in situations where 
it is in our power to counteract the extreme vulnerability of others by being 
thoughtful and considerate."61 Under certain conditions "it is right (or good in the 
moral sense) to lie"62 and not right or bad in the moral sense to tell the truth. 
These conditions may be given where disclosure of the truth would endanger 
the patient's life or health or therapy. This raises the controversial issue 
whether or not a patient may in certain circumstances be told a lie. This 
problem arises in cases of solicited information in particular. One could argue 
that a deliberate lie in response to a specific question from the patient 
constitutes evidence of bad faith vitiating the patient's consent altogether. 63 
Here the therapeutic-privilege argument would have to be used "that disclosure 
of the information would have been harmful to the patient and, accordingly, the 
lie was in the patient's best interests"64 to ward off the threat of non-disclosure 
liability, of course. The court would probably accept this argument in the case 
of a terminal cancer patient, since even in court telling the truth is not an 
absolute obligation, as Tt:Jrkel J remarked, adding that in his opinion "in the 
majority of cases, it is our duty to lie to the terminal cancer patient and in any 
case, he/she shall not be told the whole truth except of what is of vital 
importance and most necessary, for example, as for purposes of medial 
treatment". 65 Especially where a child patient is concerned "revealing the truth" 
would, in his view, be tantamount to committing "an incomparable inhuman 
61 Haberrnans op cit - note 58 at 199. 
62 Ibid 53. 
63 See Jones op cit - note 18 at 215. 
64 Ibid. 
65 TOrkel "Remarks on Telling the Truth or Lying" 1985 Med Law 92. 
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act".66 
The moral intuition underlying this argumentation can be conceptualised as the 
humanitarian principle in terms of which the doctor's duty to disclose is subject 
to a number of "Kontraindikationen" or counterindications. 67 These exceptions 
are indicated in the interest of the patient's psychological well-being, of urgently 
required treatment or in order to avert harm from third persons. In ethical terms, 
this means that the postulate of non-deception is modified by the principle of nil 
nocere. 68 
The idea justifying deception in this instance is to assist and support the patient 
instead of harming him by full disclosure. What is administered here is, in other 
words, "the drug named illusion".69 Its use is justified by the arguments (also 
employed as objections against the informed-consent doctrine in other 
instances) "that truth-telling may be contrary to the patient's own best interest; 
and that disclosure of an unfavourable or adverse diagnosis or prognosis may 
have a harmful effect on the patient and therapy". 70 
The invocation of the humanitarian principle in exceptional cases in no ways 
intrudes upon or diminishes the ideal of informed consent. On the contrary, it 
affirms that ideal, but not in terms that are so absolute or unqualified as to be 
unrealistic71 or inhuman. The humanitarian principle undermines the rigid 
monoculturalism of bioethics, reminding us in the process that in "many cultures 
medical paternalism is the morally correct way to make treatment decisions, and 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
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Ibid 93. 
Deutsch Arztrecht 2"d ed (1991) 70. 
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other approaches are simply wrong". 72 It is of course true that hard cases make 
bad law, and the violation of the principles of informed consent in general 
remains a disreputable practice of medicine. But, nevertheless, ethically sound 
procedures must be promoted to deal with such hard cases. Having recourse 
to the humanitarian principle may be one of them. 
2.4 CLINICAL ASPECTS OF INFORMED CONSENT AND THERAPEUTIC 
PRIVILEGE 
--·--·--·~--·-· 
The dimensions of informed consent established by law are augmented in 
several ways suggested by clinical experience. This is "consistent with the 
physician's ethical obligation to respect patients' autonomy and to promote their 
well being", 73 as the 1996 Resource Document of the American Psychiatric 
Association points out. It is also in keeping with the ultimate aim of bioethics 
which is to determine what ought to be done for patients, their physical and/or 
mental condition being an important factor in this process. 74 The patient's ability 
to understand information relevant to a decision and to appreciate the 
reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision, in short, his or her 
decision-making capacity, is of primary importance in this context, since capacity 
is an essential component of valid consent. 75 In law, capable patients (that is 
patients with decision-making capacity) are entitled to make their own informed 
decisions. 
This is in accordance with the ethical principles of patient autonomy and respect 
72 
73 
74 
75 
Williams op cit - note 30 at 262. 
APS Resource Document op cit - note 34. 
See Williams op cit- note 30 at 265. 
See Etchells et al "Bioethics for Clinicians : 2. Disclosure" 1996 Canadian Medical 
Association Journal 389. 
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for persons. 76 If a patient is incapable of making an informed decision, consent 
must be obtained from a proxy decision-maker to secure substitute consent. 
This is in line with the ethical principle of beneficence which requires that the 
incapable persons be protected from making decisions harmful to them or which 
they otherwise would not have made. Where capacity cannot be reasonably 
presumed, a capacity assessment is called for. 77 Incapacity to make medical 
decisions is not the same as a legal determination of incompetence which only 
a court can make. 
Capacity determinations are left to the medical or mental health professions. 78 
It thus is the responsibility of the medical profession to determine the patient's 
capacity to consent. When capacity is impaired it is the task of the medical team 
to take appropriate measures such as seeking proxy consent. 79 Refusal of 
treatment as such does not constitute evidence of incapacity. Agreement or 
disagreement with the patient's decision is not an issue here. The sole purpose 
of capacity assessment is an evaluation of the person's ability to understand the 
relevant information and to appreciate the consequences of making a decision. 80 
Similarly, the patients' reasons for a decision are irrelevant here as long as a 
decision is not based substantially on delusions or depression, in which case 
psychiatric evaluation may be indicated. 81 
Capacity assessment concerns the incapable patient. However, the legally 
required disclosure in terms of the doctrine of informed consent creates 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
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problems in the case of perfectly capable patients as well. There is a growing 
recognition that the disclosure required by law is in many - if not most - cases 
beyond the capacity of the ordinary person to such an extent that it threatens to 
impede rather than promote patient decision-making and thus might become 
self-defeating or counterproductive in the long run. 82 It has been argued that 
this development is the net result of the view taken by many jurisdictions 
adopting the informed consent doctrine that the qecision as to risk disclosure is 
a legal question, and not a medical l'1uestion 83 This in turn means that it is left 
to lay persons to express what amounts in essence to medical opinion. 
This argument84 implies a call for the return to the professional standard as 
opposed to the patient-based or lay standard, of course, and advocates a 
reversal of the modern-trend disclosure rule which is problematic indeed, even 
from a clinical point of view. For it is thought that it is generally desirable for 
patients to be given as much information as they can assimilate, even though 
they may be incapable of grasping all of it, as this practice facilitates physician-
patient collaboration in treatment. 85 
On the other hand it is an undeniable fact that unrealistic disclosure 
requirements may result in a surrogate liability incurred by the doctor's inability 
to adhere to them and in an expansion of the liability of the medical profession 
with the doctrine of informed consent as its legal mechanism.86 
While this may not be a deliberate judicial policy, the courts in America and 
82 
83 
84 
85 
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elsewhere have tended to overlook the question of patient comprehension and 
to focus instead on the physician's obligation to disclose information, 87 losing 
sight of the clinical realities of the doctor-patient relationship in the process at 
times. 
3. JUDICIAL FORMULATIONS OF THE PRIVILEGE 
3.1 Introduction 
Of all the exceptions that may narrow the scope of disclosure, therapeutic 
privilege is the most frequently discussed, though only few cases turn on its 
application.88 This situation prevails in Common Law and at Civil Law 
jurisdictions alike, with judicial lip-service being paid to a concept that in social 
reality does not feature prominently at all.89 This concept has been formulated 
by legislatures and courts in various ways. Its formulations range from the 
rather vague to the more specific, as will become apparent from the following 
survey. The parameters of the exception are as yet undefined in American and 
other legal systems alike. 90 
3.2 American Law 
It is well established in American case law and commentary that there are 
situations where the doctor may be excused from compliance with the informed-
consent requisite by the therapeutic privilege defence which allows for the 
withholding of information in circumstances where full disclosure from a medical 
87 See Robertson op cit - note 86 at 112. 
88 See Meisel op cit - note 29 at 460. 
89 See Giesen MML 380 et seq. 
90 See Strauss Doctor 18 et seq. 
-20-
point of view is considered unsound or harmful. 91 Two leading informed consent 
cases are Canterbury v Spence and Cobbs v Grant.92 Disclosure standards 
differ from Alabama to Wyoming. 93 The majority rule is the traditional medical 
community standard, the minority rule being the patient-based legal standard, 
set out, inter alia, in Cobbs and Canterbury. 94 In Pauscher v Iowan Methodist 
Medical Center the so-called patient-based standard was held to "applicable 
in all informed consent cases". This standard "makes full disclosure the rule but 
allows for numerous exceptions which the physician, who has access to the 
medical knowledge involved, can assert". 96 The question when informed 
consent is not required remains unresolved, however, as judicial views vary in 
the interpretation of each of these situations. 97 A number of exceptions to 
informed consent are peculiar to each state, one being that the "physician may 
not be responsible for failing to disclose risk(s) when the knowledge might be 
detrimental to the client's best interest". 98 
The Information Resource Manual of the American Society for Gastrointestinal 
Endoscopy (ASGE) lists five exceptions to the informed consent process, 
commenting on the therapeutic privilege exception as follows: "There are times 
when the disclosure of informed consent might be detrimental to the welfare of 
certain patients. The law recognizes this and has fashioned the exception of 
91 
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therapeutic privilege. If you believe that the informed consent disclosure would, 
on balance, be more harmful to a patient, you may delete it citing the exception. 
In reality, the law looks with a critical eye towards the use of therapeutic 
. ·1 "99 pnv1 ege ..... 
This commentary follows the Canterbury formulation of the extent of the 
therapeutic privilege closely in terms of which this "exception obtains when risk-
disclosure poses such a threat of ·detriment to the patient as to become 
unfeasible or contraindicated from a medical point of view' .100 This is the court's 
most general statement of the privilege, however. It also provided a more 
stringent formulation framed in terms of the primary functions of the informed 
consent doctrine, namely "to promote patient primacy in medical decision-
making" (1) and "rational decision-making" (2). 101 The court therefore insisted 
that the "physician's privilege to withhold information must be carefully 
circumscribed, however, for otherwise it might devour the disclosure rule 
itself' .102 
This privilege therefore constitutes a circumscribed exception to the general 
disclosure rule which does not embrace "the paternalistic notion that the 
physician may remain silent simply because divulgence might prompt the patient 
to forego therapy the physician feels the patient really needs" .103 It furthermore 
does only contemplate operation "where the patient's reaction to risk 
information, as reasonably foreseen by the physician, is menacing"; 104 and even 
then "disclosure to a close relative with a view to securing consent to the 
99 Op cit - note 36. 
100 Canterbury v Spence Supra per Robinson CJ at 789. 
101 Meisel op cit - note 29 at 462 n 158. 
102 Canterbury supra at 789. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
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proposed treatment may be the only alternative open to the physician", 105 the 
court added, thus upholding the "foundational principle that the patient should 
and ordinarily can make the choice for himself', 106 and its correlative, proxy 
consent. 
The concept of therapeutic privilege as framed in Canterbury goes to 
psychological harm only, 107 but other American cases and texts take up the 
notion of psycholoqical or physical harm, thus broadeninq the definition 
considerably. 108 Consequently therapeutic privilege has been accepted in 
regard to intravenous pyelogram or IVP cases in some American jurisdictions as 
well, where physical harm to the patient is the issue and not psychological 
detriment. 109 
Cases of that nature involve the doctrine of informed consent and are deemed 
to sound in negligence. 110 Quoting Sa/go v Leland Standford Jr University of 
Trustees111 with approval the court in Nishi v Hartwelf' 12 held that the doctrine 
of informed consent recognises "that a physician may withhold disclosure of 
information regarding any untoward consequences of a treatment where full 
disclosure will be detrimental to the patient's total care and best interest". 
The Nishi court subscribed to the view expressed in Watson v Clutts that it may 
105 
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107 
108 
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be difficult "to state any hard and fast rules as to the extent of the disclosure 
required"113 and accepted the argument that the "doctor's primary duty is to do 
what is best for the patient" which means in turn: "Any conflict between this duty 
and that of a frightening disclosure ordinarily should be resolved in favour of the 
primary duty."114 In the Nishi case the court adopted the view that the question 
of negligence in a medical malpractice action is to be decided "by reference to 
relevant medical standards"115 to be proved by the plaintiff as being applicable. 
The only medical standard established in this case was the defendants' own 
testimony which the court "deemed to be expert medical testimony"116 sufficient 
to justify the defendant-doctors' omission to disclose even under the minority 
rule. 117 But the court did not go into the respective merits of the prevailing 
majority rule and the minority rule, deeming this unnecessary under the 
circumstances. 
The standard adopted by the Nishi court has been criticised as being 
"antithetical to individualistic values", 118 however, because it does not take into 
account the patient's ability to participate in medical decision-making at all. It 
was vindicated nevertheless in another IVP case were an action was brought 
against a radiologist for wrongful death of a patient allegedly caused by the 
radiologist's failure to inform the patient of the potential fatal risk involved in the 
IVP procedure. 119 The court, on the other hand, supported the view adopted in 
the Canterbury case that "the therapeutic privilege does not allow a physician 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
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to withhold risk information because the physician feels the information might 
prompt the patient to forego treatment" .120 There may well be other American 
IVP cases involving wrongful death allegations where the doctor's non-
disclosure was excused on the basis of therapeutic privilege in similar vein. 121 
But, as far as is known, not in Canada. 
3.3 Canadian Law 
The legal status of therapeutic privilege in Canada is uncertain. The IVP case 
of Meyer Estate v Rogers122 involving a patient who died after intravenous 
injection of a contrast medium for a routine radiologic procedure, makes this 
abundantly clear. The radiologist claimed therapeutic privilege as a defence 
against his alleged failure to warn the patient of the risks of intravenous dye 
injection. The court, in rejecting the defence on the grounds that therapeutic 
privilege was not applicable, held that "the Supreme Court of Canada has not, 
in Reibl, adopted or even approved the therapeutic privilege exception in 
Canada", and concluded that the "instant case may well be the first one in 
Canada where that issue falls squarely to be determined" .123 
In Reibl v Hughes124 the court alluded to the privilege by commenting "that a 
particular patient may, because of emotional factors, be unable to cope with 
facts relevant to recommend surgery or treatment and the doctor may, in such 
a case, be justified in withholding or generalizing information as to which he 
120 
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Supra at 704. 
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where the physicians were relying on the defence of therapeutic privilege, but where the 
court did not have to decide on the basis thereof. Mulvaney op cit - note 114 at 83 
nevertheless feels that "Arato is a strong case for the use of therapeutic privilege" in 
principle. 
Supra at 314. 
Ibid. 
(1980) 114 DLR 3rd 1at13. 
-25-
would otherwise be required to be more specific". This comment is an obiter 
dictum. The therapeutic privilege exception was raised and summarily 
dismissed in Haughian v Pain125 with the court remarking: "There is no 
suggestion here that the respondent withheld the information because of 
'therapeutic privilege'. There was no suggestion that disclosure would have 
unduly frightened the appellant, caused him psychological harm or deterred him 
from taking treatment essential to his health. The respondent's position was 
Rimrlv thFJt it waR not his practice t~ warn of this risk". Maloney J in Meyer 
Estate v Rogers126 was not only of the opinion "that the therapeutic privilege 
exception does not form part of the law of Canada", but also expressed the view 
"that it should not become part" thereof. He gave two reasons for this, namely 
(1) what he considered "an unwarranted extension of the privilege beyond its 
original scope which protected patients only from potential psychological harm" 
. in the United States, and (2) the potential of the privilege "to override the 
requirement for informed consent" and to swallow the disclosure rule 
altogether. 127 
Although therapeutic privilege is in fact practised in Canada (for example in 
giving placebos to hypochondriacs}, its scope is said to be far more limited than 
previously. 128 In view of the uncertain legal status of therapeutic privilege 
clinicians in Canada are advised against invoking it. It is said to be better "to 
offer information and allow the patient to refu~e or accept further disclosure"129 
for several reasons. Such a practice is (1) in keeping with the ethical principles 
of patient autonomy and respect for persons, (2) it promotes patients' informed 
participation in health-care decisions, and (3) also promotes a trusting 
125 (1987) 37 DLR 4th 624 at 644. 
126 Supra at 316. 
127 Ibid. 
128 See Williams op cit note 30 at 263. 
129 Etchells op cit - note 75 at 389. 
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relationship between patient and health-care provider. 130 
3.4 Anglo-Australian Law 
The English courts do not recognise the doctrine of informed consent. 131 
Consequently, in the absence of a general duty of disclosure, no recognition has 
been given to therapeutic privilege as a restriction to the informed-consent 
requisite either 
The English courts deal with such cases on the basis of the patient's best 
interests principle instead.132 The notion of "therapeutic privilege is thus not a 
defence in a non-disclosure case, but is incorporated within the duty of 
disclosure itself, in line with Sidaway v Beth/em Royal Hospital Govemors. 133 
This means that where "the medical evidence indicates that the normal practice 
of the profession is to disclose a particular risk, it will be for the defendant to 
justify non-disclosure to the patient" .134 Scarman LJ in Sidaway135 described the 
scope of the therapeutic privilege as follows: "This exception enables a doctor 
to withhold from his patient information as to risk if it can be shown that a 
reasonable assessment of the patient would have indicated to the doctor that 
disclosure would have posed a serious threat of psychological detriment to the 
patient". 
130 
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In Lee v South West Thames Regional Health Authority136 it was suggested that 
the doctor's duty to answer a patient's question must be "subject to the exercise 
of clinical judgement as to the terms in which the information is given and the 
extent to which, in the patient's interests, information be withheld". The best 
interests of the patient principle referred to in this statement has been criticised 
as an example of paternalism overriding the patient's right to self 
determination. 137 
In Hatcher v Black138 the matter was taken a step further. The court held that a 
doctor may even tell a lie if he considers this to be in the patient's best interests. 
It seems, however, that the judicially sanctioned white lie is precluded by the 
comment made by Bridge LJ in Sidaway1 39 that the doctor's duty must be "to 
answer both truthfully and as fully as the questioner requires" when questioned 
specifically by a patient. 
In Australia the professional standard or the Bo/am principles has been 
discarded. 140 Instead the courts have adopted a patient oriented standard. 141 
Two leading decisions of the Australian courts on the standards of disclosure 
required of a doctor in treating a patient are F v R and Rogers v Whitaker. 142 
King CJ in F v R accepted that "there may be circumstances in which 
136 
137 
138 
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140 
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142 
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reasonable care for the patient may justify or even require an evasive or less 
than fully candid answer even to a direct request". 143 This approach is similar 
to that subsequently adopted by Scarman LJ in Sidaway144 and has been 
followed in later cases as well. 145 King CJ specified two situations in particular 
in which a doctor is justified in withholding information and refraining from 
volunteering information, namely (1) "when he judges on reasonable grounds 
that the patient's health, physical or mental, might be seriously harmed by the 
information". and (2) vvhen the doctor reasonably judqes that a patient's 
temperament or emotional state is such that he would be unable to make the 
information a basis for a rational decision" .146 King CJ adhered to this in the 
later case of Battersby v Tollman, 147 where these considerations were applied 
to the facts. The court in Rogers v Whitaker148 fully agreed with the views 
expressed by King CJ in F v R. 149 
3.5 German Law 
In German law the notion of therapeutic privilege is accepted in terms of contra-
indications to the duty to inform, but within narrow limitations only. 150 The 
German courts recognise a defence of therapeutic privilege which allows 
doctors to manipulate the amount of information given to patients in exceptional 
cases. 151 The German Federal Supreme Court has not excluded the possibility 
143 Supra at 192. 
144 Supra. 
145 See Rogers v Whitaker supra at 51. 
146 Supra at 193. 
147 (1985) 37 SASR 524 at 527. 
148 Supra at 52 .. 
149 Supra. 
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that objective reasons may justify a reduction of the scope of disclosure required 
as a rule, but has strongly objected to the notion of therapeutic privilege as 
such.152 It has only "allowed therapeutic reasons which may narrow rather than 
negative disclosure to the patient" .153 Therapeutic reasons for narrowing the 
scope if disclosure are legally only acceptable in very rare circumstances and 
must be very narrowly construed accordingly. Otherwise the patient's general 
right to know might be undermined inadvertently or deliberately. 154 
This right is firmly entrenched in German law as a result of a decision of the 
Imperial Court in 1894 which ruled that medical treatment without consent 
constituted assault or K6rperverletzung. The controversy created by this legal 
construction was finally settled by a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court 
in 1979 concerning the professional liability of medical doctors and the 
fundamental principle of patient autonomy. 155 The Federal Supreme Court has 
recognised restrictions to the duty of disclosure only where disclosure would 
cause the patient serious physical or psychological harm or even death, 156 or 
would detrimentally affect his or her health or therapy. 157 
The Federal Supreme Court held that where a detailed disclosure was 
contraindicated because it would cause "serious and irreversible damage of the 
patient's health" non-disclosure might be justifiable, 158 whilst proxy consent 
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should be sought from friends or relatives. 159 This formulation has been 
criticised as being very strict and narrowminded (engherzig), however. 160 
The Federal Supreme Court has furthermore recognised, in the context of 
psychiatry and psychotherapy, that the scope of disclosure may be narrowed 
where the interests of third parties such as family and friends who have testified 
against the patient must be safeguarded. 161 
The German courts try to strike a balance between the patient's right to self-
determination and the doctor's capacity to adhere to the strict disclosure 
requirements realistically. With this purpose in mind the courts have allowed for 
exceptions to the general disclosure rule, but construed these very narrowly in 
view of the overriding principle of patient autonomy which is firmly established 
in German case law and in the German Basic Law alike, which in article 2 
entrenches the right to bodily integrity and self-determination. 162 
4. CONCLUSION 
The duty to disclose is not absolute, but relative. On this there is general 
agreement. Various instances can be identified in which the duty of disclosure 
is restricted or does not exist at all. These exceptions to the general disclosure 
rule have been conveniently categorised in the form of instances where the 
defence of therapeutic privilege is applicable in certain jurisdictions. 163 These 
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are the following: 
(1) Where disclosure would be detrimental to the patient's health (physical 
or mental) or endanger his or her life. 
(2) Where it might interfere with the patient's rational decision-making. 
(3) Where it might detrimentally affect the patient's therapy. 
(4) Where it would be inhuman. 
(5) Where the risks attached to tt are as qrave as those attached to the 
treatment or even outweigh them. 
(6) Where it will present a threat to a third party. 
The following cases illustrate some of the instances where the defence of 
therapeutic privilege might be applicable in the context of disclosure and patient 
consent. These cases are hypothetical. They do, however, reflect case law and 
factual information obtained from a variety of sources, including informal 
discussions with clinicians and medical practitioners. 
Instances (1) and (2) 
Mr A is 92 years old and lives at home on his own. He is a retired 
psychoanalyst. He undergoes a sudden change in his mental state that 
is characterised by confusion and disorientation. He runs away from 
home and is hospitalised, suffering inter alia from delusions. He is 
diagnosed with a type of delirium that affects the elderly, a condition that 
is reversible if certain drugs are administered. Mr A is kept in the dark 
about his condition because the doctor fears that Mr A would not submit 
to such treatment, and even more importantly, might commit suicide on 
disclosure of his condition due to hurt feelings and professional pride. 
Antipsychotic drugs are therefore administered without the patient's 
knowledge. Mr A is able to return home where he resumes his normal life 
while the treatment continues under false pretences with the family doctor 
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administering the drugs. Mr A's relatives are, however, fully informed and 
have consented on his behalf. 
Instance (3) 
Mr N, a retired dentist, has to undergo a diagnostic surgical procedure to 
determine the existence of aortic aneurism, that is a bulge or dilation in 
thA wal! of ~n ~rtPPr hP.rP. thA aort~ ThP. nrocedure involves the injection 
of a radio-opaque contrast medium known to cause serious side effects 
in some patients, including paralysis from the waist down. Mr N is a well-
educated person, but he is also very frightened and apprehensive about 
his condition. The doctors feel that the disclosure of the collateral 
hazards involved in the procedure would unnecessarily frighten the 
patient who suffers from a severe heart condition accompanied by 
hypertension. They therefore proceed without fully informing the patient 
of the collateral risks involved in the procedure. The patient ends up 
paralysed from the waist down. 
Mr S, a pensioner, suffers from stomach pains. His family doctor places 
him on medication and a bland diet. The pains persist and he undergoes 
an upper and lower gastro-intestinal series of tests. These tests reveal 
what appears to be a mass of tumour in his lower intestines. It is 
determined that the next diagnostic step is for Mr S to undergo an 
intravenous pyelogram (IVP). The radiologist does not inform Mr S about 
the possibility of a fatal reaction to the contrast medium used in the 
procedure. The doctor is convinced that patient apprehension plays a 
significant role in the reaction to the contrast material. He fears that Mr 
Swill undergo the proposed procedure anyway, whether fully informed 
about the risks involved in it or not, the only difference being that the 
anxiety resulting from the disclosure of these risks might cause a fatal 
reaction. Mr S suffers a severe reaction and dies. 
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A youth troubled by back pain submits to an operation without being 
informed of a risk of paralysis incidental thereto. The doctor feels that 
the risk of paralysis is a very slight possibility only. He omits to inform 
the patient of this risk because in his view such communication might 
produce adverse psychological reactions which could preclude the 
success of the operation. A day after the operation the patient falls from 
his hospital bed. A few hours after the fall, the lower half of his body is 
paralysed and he has to undergo another operation. Even years later, 
he hobbles about on crutches, a victim of paralysis of the bowels and 
urinary incontinence. 
Instance (4) 
A famous German writer, Theodor Storm, is told that he suffers from 
terminal cancer. He is devastated, unable to work and despondent. His 
doctors convene a meeting and reconsider their findings. But they arrive 
at the same conclusion as before. They do, however, not reveal the truth 
to the writer, but tell him that he is not suffering from cancer after all. He 
settles down to his usual routine and completes a literary masterpiece 
that makes him one of the great writers of his time. 
Doctor R is renowned for his diagnostic acumen and curt truthfulness. 
For that reason his opinion is highly valued. He is not a mere doctor 
expressing an opinion, but a judge pronouncing a verdict. Doctor R is 
called upon to make a house call and subsequent operation on his 
dearest friend. His friend is very sick, actually dying in the doctor's 
judgement, and requests a truthful prognosis in order to settle his will. If 
the doctor reveals his pessimistic opinion that his patient will not survive 
the night, then this would virtually amount to a death sentence. It would 
also, in the doctor's view, destroy the thousandth part of a change that 
the patient had of survival. Dr R does a piece of acting and assures his 
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friend and patient that he will live. The patient survives indeed. 
A middle-aged patient undergoes an operation for the removal of a 
kidney and is discovered to have a tumour on the tail of the pancreas. 
The surgeon believes that the entire malignancy is removed, but he 
nevertheless refers the patient for follow-up therapy to another specialist. 
There the patient is asked to complete a questionnaire and to answer the 
question whether he wishes to be told the truth about his condition. The 
patient states that he wishes to be told the truth. In spite of this request 
the physician does not disclose the statistical life expectancy information 
that only two percent of males live for five years after the diagnosis of 
pancreatic cancer. He feels that the disclosure of extremely high 
mortality rates for malignancies such as pancreatic cancer might 
effectively deprive a patient of any hope of cure and become a self-
fulfilling prophecy. The treatment appears to be successful. However, 
after the patient reads a newspaper article stating the life expectancy 
information of his cancer, he suffers a recurrence and dies. 
Instance (5) 
A doctor at a public hospital prescribes a prolonged course of a particular 
drug for a patient suffering from mental illness. The doctor does not warn 
the patient or the patient's relatives of the risk of damage to the eyes, 
because he is of the opinion that this would have an adverse effect upon 
the patient. Mere knowledge of the risk to her vision might be sufficient 
to give rise to the real risk of hysterical blindness. The patient might also 
refuse to undergo treatment. Such refusal is likely to result in 
indeterminate confinement in a mental institution with a high risk of 
suicide. The patient goes blind. 
A patient undergoes a diagnostic intravenous pyelogram or IVP test. The 
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radiologist does not warn the patient of the risks of severe reaction and 
even death inherent in the procedure. He does this in accordance with 
the view shared by his professional association that the risk of informing 
patients of "low risk" procedures including IVP exceeds the risk of not 
informing them at all, as the most important factors in the production of 
contrast media reactions are the patients' fear and apprehension. The 
patient dies in consequence of an allergic reaction. 
The general view is that the doctor's duty to disclose is restricted in 
circumstances where full disclosure would be more harmful than non-disclosure; 
and this to such an extent that the doctor might even resort to a white lie in 
exceptional cases, the only moot point being whether or not such a lie is 
justifiable where the patient asks questions. 164 
The courts are reluctant, however, to apply the therapeutic privilege in medical 
malpractice cases, and quite rightly so, some writers say, arguing that the 
danger of allowing medical paternalism in through the back door vindicates the 
courts' attitude. It has even been submitted "that the law must discourage the 
widespread invocation of this privilege by not allowing it as a defence in consent 
cases" .165 Other are more general in favour of applying this defence, 
however, 166 taking a less restrictive stance. Thus it has been argued that there 
is "a definite need for a legal defence to non-disclosure in cases where the harm 
caused by disclosure would outweigh the harm caused by non-disclosure", 167 but 
the term "therapeutic necessity" would be more appropriate to it. The Castell 
164 
165 
166 
167 
See Van Oosten "Castell v De Greet and the Doctrine of Informed Consent" 1995 De 
Jure 172. 
Giesen Law Med 122. 
See Giesen MML 352 n 515 criticising this approach as favouring doctors in general with 
Claassen & Verschoor op cit - note 35 at 71 agreeing, while Mulvaney op cit -note 114 
at 65 argued that the privilege is a necessary and important defence in informed-
consent cases, but suggests that "the courts need to develop a clearer rule on when and 
how the defence can be applied". 
Van Oosten De Jure 177. 
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court's approach to the defence reflects both lines of argument in recognising 
the need for the defence, but at the same time associating it with medical 
paternalism, which renders it ambivalent indeed. 168 
There are jurists who feel that the doctrine of therapeutic privilege should be 
abolished altogether because its invocation invariably reintroduces the 
professional standard of disclosure. 169 Others maintain that this need not be 
the case, however, provided the courots adopt rules for its invocation in practice 
which resolve that problem one way or another. 170 
When all is said and done it remains less than clear whether a real need exists 
for therapeutic privilege as an exception to the general disclosure rule. Even a 
stringently formulated privilege is easily undercut by rules concerning its 
application. Therefore it has been concluded that "there seems to be no valid 
reason to preserve the privilege, and certainly not one which is loosely 
defined". 171 Echoing these sentiments Maloney Jin MeyerEstate172 remarked: 
"The danger that the therapeutic privilege poses to self-determination in medical 
decision-making is so great that we should seriously consider its abolition". 
Others see the therapeutic privilege simply as a device that "pays lip service to 
the principles of truth telling and self-determination, while it creates a 
discretionary exception which is quite capable of swallowing these principles 
168 
169 
170 
171 
172 
Ibid. 
See Meisel op cit - note 29 at 467 and 431 n 69; Giesen MML 385. 
Fennell op cit - note 33 at 292 states that the central issue in Britain and elsewhere 
today is "the basis on which the right to make one's own treatment decision should be 
suspended", and submits that "there is a clear need to produce a single coherent legal 
basis on which peoples' right of treatment decision-making can be removed" (at 293). 
The guidelines for the application of the privilege formulated by Fennell are in keeping 
with those provided by Van Oosten. The approach adopted by Fennell is that favoured 
by the common law and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights with 
"incapacity as the gatekeeper concept" and "a presumption in favour of capacity" (at 
293). See also Strauss Legal Handbook 1 o. 
Meisel op cit 469. 
Supra at 314. 
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when the doctor decides the occasion requires it", 173 thus taking the debate a 
step further by raising a moral issue. This issue concerns the difference 
between what is said and what is done. This difference is morally relevant. My 
reluctance to agree with this analysis and conclusion concerns the role that 
intention is supposed to play in all this and the conspiracy theory that taints this 
argument. After all, much depends on the manner in which the exception is 
defined and applied. The narrower the definition and the more restricted the 
application of therapeutic privile9e, the more the balance is struck in favour of 
individualism and the less in favour of the societal interest in health care. The 
one is the logical converse of the other and there is ample room for choices to 
be made here, legal, ethical and clinical choices that determine the parameters 
of the therapeutic privilege and circumscribe its application. 
173 Kennedy The Unmasking of Medicine (1981) 87 et seq. The concept of "therapeutic 
research" has the potential of disguising the distinction between inteNentions that are 
therapeutic and others that are non-therapeutic and thus may be used " to lower the 
standards for obtaining informed consent", according to Annas "Questing for Grails : 
Duplicity, Betrayal and Self-Deception in Postmodern Medical Research" 1996 Journal 
of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 315. Experimentation disguised as therapy has 
been rejected in a case arising from the Cincinnati Whole Body Radiation Experiment 
which involved 88 subjects from 1960 to 1971. The court, in a decision that is "most 
noteworthy for its uniqueness", permitted a lawsuit by the families of the subjects 
against the researchers. Annas op cit 309 n 41. See In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig 87 4 
F Supp 796 (SD Ohio 1995). 
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SUMMARY 
This dissertation examines the nature and scope of the therapeutic privilege defence in 
non-disclosure cases in the context of the doctor's duty to procure a properly informed 
consent from this patient and his duty to heal, which sometimes are in conflict. The judicial 
formulations of the so-called therapeutic privilege are an attempt to resolve this conflict 
equitably. They raise a number of questions, however. To answer these questions this 
dissertation (l) ex.a111iries tr1e diI1c:1c:11L aspect~ of 1nior111c:ci consenL, \.i..; bAtJlu10~ th0 
leading formulations of the therapeutic privilege concept, and (3) evaluates the ongoing 
debate concerning its parameters. 
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